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SOME POPULAR CRITICISMS OF COURTS
HON. WALTER C. OWEN,

Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court.

This is a government of law. A wholesome respect for the
law gives assurance of its easy maintenance. Upon the confidence
reposed in courts depends in large measure the respect entertained
for the law. The courts constitute that branch of government
established to apportion and administer justice to its citizens according to the preconceived notions of the majority as reflected
by laws of their enactment.
Human nature cries out for justice. That is the one thing
above all others for the attainment of which men will sacrifice
their lives. If they feel that it cannot be attained through existing
institutions, we must recognize their disposition to rebel against
such institutions and the instincts which impel them to attain
justice by other means.
According to our present enlightenment, there can be a no more
just form of government than that which accords to every person
an equal voice therein and affords a way of intrenching the will
of the majority as the law of the land, if that will, expressed in
statutes, is correctly interpreted and sternly enforced without
fear or favor by the courts. The minority cannot insist upon
their views. It is for them to acquiesce in and abide by the expressed will of the majority. If they fail to do this, and attempt
by force to impose their own views on the majority, or to interfere
with the conduct of government as ordered by the majority, they
become enemies of society and should be promptly and sternly
dealt with as such.
The minority has every right, however, to propagate and disseminate their views, and when such views are embraced and
approved by a majority of the people they may, in a well-ordered
manner, mold such ideas into the law of the land.
Unless we have reached the millenium, we have every right to
expect a certain amount of unrest and dissatisfaction with things
as they are. Absolute peace, contentment and security could
be attributable only to the coming of the millenium or to the mental
stagnation of our race. A little kicking is a healthful sign. It
gives evidence of life. It indicates an appreciation of and a desire
to attain something higher and better. It creates progress. So
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far as such dissatisfaction manifests itself in legitimate ways and
through legitimate channels it is not to be deplored nor should it be
restrained. Our constant effort should be to make the lawful
way the effective way of attaining the will of the majority.
The people have created the courts as an arm or branch of
their government to administer and enforce their laws. In the
discharge of this function the people have a right to demand
fidelity. The manner in which courts respond to this function
is a legitimate gubject of discussion. As said in State ex rel
Attorney General vs. Circuit Court for Eau Claire County, 97
Wis. I, at p. 12:
"Important as it is that courts should perform their grave
public duties unimpeded and unprejudiced by illegitimate
influences, there are other rights guaranteed to all citizens
by our constitution and form of government, either expressly
or impliedly, which are fully as important, and which must
be guarded with an equally jealous care. These rights are
the right of free speech and a free publication of the citizen's
sentiments 'on all subjects'."
This fundamental right of the citizen is coming to be indulged
more and more. Whether rightly or wrongly, there is abundant
evidence of a growing dissatisfaction on the part of the people
with the manner in which courts are performing the functions
imposed upon them under our form of government. The subject
has received the attention of presidents and ex-presidents, publicists and statesmen, lawyers and judges, and has been held of
sufficient importance to be accorded mention in a President's
Message to Congress and in a national political platform.
In his first message to the 6Ist Congress, President Taft said:
"The deplorable delays in the administration of civil and
criminal law have received the attention of Committees of
the American Bar Association and of many State Bar Associations, as well as the considered thought of judges and
jurists. * * * Of course these remarks apply quite as
well to the administration of justice in state courts as to
that in federal courts, and without making invidious distinction it is perhaps not too much to say that, speaking generally,
the defects are less in the federal courts than in the state
courts. The expedition with which business is disposed of
both on the civil and criminal side of English courts under
modern rules of procedure makes the delays in our courts
seem archaic and barbarous."
The platform of the Progressive Republican Party, for 1912,
demanded "such restriction of the power of the court as shall
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leave to the people the ultimate authority to determine fundamental questions of social welfare and public policy" and pledged
itself to provide "that when an act passed under the police power
of the state is held unconstitutional under the state constitution
by the courts, the people, after an ample interval for deliberation,
shall have an opportunity to vote upon the question whether they
desire the act to become a law notwithstanding such decision."
In an introduction to a book entitled Our rudicial Oligarchy
Senator La Follette gave expression to the following sentiment:
"The judiciary alone, of all our institutions of government,
has enjoyed for many years almost complete freedom from
hostile criticism. Until very recently, this branch of our government stood alone above the legislative and executive departments in popular esteem. Unresponsive, and unresponsible to the public the courts dwelt in almost sacred isolation.
"Within the last two or three years the public has begun
to turn a critical eye upon the work of the judges. The
people in their struggle to destroy special privilege and to
open the way for human rights through truly representative
government, found barrier after barrier placed across the
way of progress by the courts. Gradually the judiciary began to loom up as the one formidable obstacle which must be
overcome before anything substantial could be accomplished
to free the public from the exactions of oppressive monopolies and from the domination of property interests. A
new problem entered into the movement toward democracy
-the problem of removing the dead hand of precedent from
the judiciary and infusing into it the spirit of the times. So
the people, in their need, dropped the unquestioning veneration which Custom has fostered as a shield for the judges,
and began to examine into the tendencies and practices of
the courts. * * * The judiciary has grown to be the most
powerful institution in our governmfent. It, more than any
other, may advance or retard human progress. * * * The
regard of the courts for fossilized precedent, their absorption
in technicalities, their detachment from the vital, living facts
of the present day, their constant thinking on the side of the
rich and powerful and privileged classes have brought our
courts into conflict with the democratic spirit and purposes
of this generation. * * * They have taken to themselves
a power it was never intended they should exercise; a power
greater than that entrusted to the courts of any other enlightened nation. And because this tremendous power has
been so generally exercised on the side of the wealthy and
powerful few, the courts have become at last the strongest
bulwark of special privilege."
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The sentiment just quoted is by no means isolated, and is
selected for use here because it is conveniently at hand. Similar
expressions have come from many others, including Judge Seymour D. Thompson, in an address before the State Bar Association of Texas in i896. While discussion of this character has
not been so prominent for the last two years, or since our engagement in the world war, it may be said that neither has discussion
with reference to other internal affairs been so prominent. Now
that the war is closed we may expect public attention to recur
to this along with other questions relating to internal affairs; and
it is to be noted that only recently the American Federation of
Labor indulged in a denunciation of courts for their alleged
usurpation of power.
The evidence adduced is sufficient to indicate a feeling on the
part of the people that the courts are falling down in the performance of their functions in at least these respects: (i) Unwarranted
delays in the administration of the law; (2) An undue regard
for precedents and technicalities; and (3) A too willing disposition
to nullify acts of the legislature by condemning them as unconstitutional.
It will not do to cynically waive these charges aside. They must
be met. If they are based on facts they are serious. If not based
on facts then the charges themselves constitute a serious matter
because they unjustly reflect upon the fidelity of courts and detract from their usefulness in maintaining order and stability,
peace and tranquility ainong our people. The first and sensible
thing to do, therefore, is to ascertain whether these charges are
founded on facts. This is a matter concerning which the public
is entitled to be advised. I have great confidence in the combined
judgment of the American people when that judgment is based
upon an understanding of the facts; and if they are given the facts
I have no doubt that the people will deal wisely and justly with
this subject.
It is due to the people of this state, and to the members of the
judiciary as well, that the facts involving the fidelity of the
judiciary of the state be declared. It is my purpose to review
the judicial situation in this state so far as it has a bearing upon
these general criticisms which have been leveled at the courts.
I can understand that the propriety of my doing this, inasmuch
as I am now a member of the judiciary, may be at once questioned. That matter has been thoroughly considered by myself
6r
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and, after consultation with the late Chief Justice Winslow, it
seemed to us not altogether inappropriate that I should do this.
This is a matter that was on my mind long before I became a
member of the court. I have had a feeling for many years that
these criticisms hurled at courts in general were unjust so far
as the judiciary of the State of Wisconsin is concerned, and that
somewhere, someone should make an effort to place the citizenship of this state in possession of the facts as they relate to the
judiciary of this state in these particulars. The judicial history
of this state to which I shall refer was made up before I became
a member of the court. The history of the court to be hereinafter
treated, was not of my making in any particular. That is one reason
why I feel that I may properly undertake this task. Another
reason is, that it is not my purpose to assume the r6le of defender
of the court in any sense, but rather to here produce, and make
something in the nature of a quasi-public record to which persons
interested in the subject may have convenient reference, the simple
facts of the case.
With the exception of the circuit courts of Milwaukee county,
the courts of record of this state are fully abreast of their work.
In Milwaukee county the circuit courts are something more than
a year behind with the court's business. It is doubtful, however,
whether this situation may be properly attributable to the courts
or to the procedure of the courts. Milwaukee is a large city and
gives rise to a great volume of trial work. The six circuit judges
of that county hold court continuously except for a short time
during a summer vacation. They are devoting their entire time
to the dispatch of business, and contribute so far as they are able
to the disposition of pending cases. It is altogether likely that the
congestion there means that there is more work than the number
of judges which the law has provided can dispatch. A situation
of this kind is not attributable to the fault of the courts nor can
it be cited as justification for criticism of judicial procedure. It
simply means that the legislature has not provided sufficient judges
to promptly dispatch the business. As above stated, all other
courts of record of the state are fully up with their work.
In every county of the state there are two regular terms of the
circuit court during the year, and a number of special terms.
These regular terms are approximately but not exactly six months
apart. If a litigant commences a lawsuit just too late for the
first term, he may expect that it can be brought to trial and dis-
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posed of at the hext term, which should not be later than seven
months from the time of the commencement of the action. If he
commences his action thirty days prior to the term it is possible
for him to have the action disposed of at that term, in which case
he is able to have his action tried and disposed of in the circuit
court within from thirty to sixty days after its commencement.
This relates to jury cases. Court cases may be disposed of at
special terms and can be brought to trial much more frequently.
There are two terms of the supreme court during the year; one
is known as the August term, the other as the January term. Any
cause filed in that court before the fifteenth day of August is
placed on the August calendar. Any cause filed before the first
day of January is placed on the January calendar. A cause placed
on the August calendar will be decided not later than the first of
March. Any cause placed on the January calendar will be decided
not later than the first of July, save in rare and exceptional cases.
Any cause filed too late to go on the August calendar will nevertheless be placed on the January calendar and be decided before
the first of July following. Any cause filed too late to go on
the January calendar will be placed on the August calendar and,
in the ordinary course of events, will be decided before March i,
following. It is the rather exceptional case that is not disposed
of by the supreme court in less than a year after it has been filed
in that court, and it may be decided within two months after it
has been so filed. Any litigant, therefore, has a right to expect
that a case instituted by him may be brought to trial in the circuit
court within seven months after its institution, and that if appealed
to the supreme court it will be decided by that court within a year
after it is there filed. Where a longer time is consumed it is not
attributable to the fault of the courts or to the judicial system of
the state. We all know of course that not all cases are disposed
of with this dispatch. But the point is that any delay beyond the
periods of time indicated is not attributable to the courts. Of
course there are many cases complex in their nature, which require
much time for preparation and call for testimony from a multitude
of witnesses, which are not and cannot be disposed of as expeditiously as the ordinary lawsuit. The interests of justice demand
that there be a certain amount of deliberation in the matter of
the preparation, trial, consideration and decision of a lawsuit, and
it frequently happens that, in order to permit both parties to the
controversy to fully and properly present their sides of the case,
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concessions extending time, continuances over the term, etc., must
be granted. But such instances are not attributable to derelictions,
usurpations or other faults on the part of the court, or judicial procedure.
We will all agree, however, that there are too many needless
continuances of lawsuits over the term, which have a tendency
to unduly protract litigation and delay the settlement of controversies. My experience at the Bar leads me to remark that
attorneys are oftentimes disposed to accept rather specious reasons
as an excuse for letting a case go over the term. Such practice is
responsible in no small degree for the impression prevailing in
the minds of laymen that justice is anything but speedy, and not
knowing where else to lay the blame they blame the courts. Needless continuances of cases over the term should be discouraged,
and this for the benefit of the attorneys as well as the litigants
and the good standing of the courts. The business man of today,
he who has business to entrust to lawyers, is a man of decision and
action. He wants matters closed up, controversies settled. A
lawyer who disposes of his business and secures results commends
himself quite as much to his favorable consideration as one who
has greater prowess and learning in the law but who lacks in the
faculty of getting things done. Energy, attention to and disposition of matters entrusted to the lawyer's care, is quite as much a
factor in winning clients and fixing his standing at the Bar as
legal acumen and learning. To the lawyer there is everything
to be gained and nothing to be lost by bringing his cases to an early
and speedy trial. In addition, this will go a long way towards
rendering obsolete the remark upon the law's delays.
To gratify my curiosity concerning the average life of a lawsuit I secured data from 82 cases pending before the supreme
court, disclosing the time of the service of the summons and the
time of the final disposition by the court of last resort. It may
be of interest to know that the average time elapsing from the
service of the summons to the final disposition as disclosed by
such data was twenty-three months. Fourteen cases, or seventeen
per cent., were decided by the supreme court within a year after
the service of the summons; two within five months; two within
seven months; two within nine months; one within ten months;
one within eleven months; and six within twelve months after they
were begun. This shows what can be done in this state under
favorable conditions by an aggressive and vigorous attorney.
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It should be remarked that the time intervening between the
decision of the case in the circuit court and the filing of the papers
in the supreme court depends much upon the vigor with which
the attorney prosecutes his appeal. He may appeal promptly or
he may permit it to drag, in which instance of course the spread
between the decision in the circuit court and in the supreme court
is bound to be greater. Nineteen of these cases, or twenty-three
per cent., were decided by the supreme court between twelve and
eighteen months after they were started. Eighteen, or twentytwo per cent., were decided between eighteen and twenty-four
months after they were begun. Sixty-two per cent. of the cases,
therefore, were decided by the court of last resort within two
years after they were started. The decision of the supreme court
in but seven of these cases, or eight per cent. of the whole, was
delayed more than three years from the time they were started.
Adverting to the criticism that courts are disposed to magnify
technicalities at the expense of justice, it is unnecessary to say
that at the present time in the state of Wisconsin justice is not
sacrificed by reason of technical considerations. I do not recall
a single case that has been reversed since I became a member of
the supreme court, for purely technical reasons. One who expects a reversal of his case at the hands of that court must now
assign as error something which goes to the merits or to the justice
of the case. No longer are cases reversed for a mere slip of the
tongue in charging the jury, or for any error unless it probably
affected the result. During my administration of the office of
attorney general, covering the five year period from 1913 to 1918,
but four criminal cases were reversed.
When a case is considered by the supreme court, final disposition
thereof is made if possible. The effort is to end and not to protract
litigation. Judgment is ordered upon the record as it stands, if
it is possible to do so. A perusal of cases reported in 167 Wis.,
disclosed that thirty-five out of ninety-eight, or practically thirtyfive per cent. of the whole, were reversed. Of the thirty-five
reversed, twenty-three were remanded with instructions to render
judgment, and only twelve were remanded for a new trial or
for further proceedings.
The average number of cases instituted in the state upon which
a suit tax was paid, for the six years ending July I, 1918, was
8,820 per year. The cases coming to the supreme court averaged
not more than 400 per year. This means that less than five per
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cent. of the cases started reached the court of last resort. Of those
about one-third are reversed, and of those reversed only one-third
are remanded for a new trial.
From all this we see that so far as the state of Wisconsin is
concerned there is little occasion for the assertion that prompt
and speedy justice cannot be secured. If a litigant employs the
right kind of an attorney, unless he has an extraordinary case, he
can secure a trial and an adjudication of his rights in the circuit
court within seven months from the commencement of his action.
In ninety-five per cent. of the cases that settles the matter, as only
five per cent. of the cases started are appealed to the supreme
court. If his case is appealed promptly, he may expect a decision
of that court at any time from three to fourteen months after the
filing of the appeal.
This would seem to afford scant justification for the suggestion
that the administration of justice is delayed through inefficient or
unbusinesslike administration of the courts of Wisconsin.
In preparing a paper on another occasion I secured some data
which, while not strictly apropos of what we are discussing nevertheless is not wholly unrelated, and I think will be of interest.
I had thought to exalt the courts of Wisconsin, by comparison
with other state courts, in the matter of the dispatch of business.
It had been my understanding that the supreme court of the state
of Wisconsin stood out rather prominently as one of the few courts
that was up with its work. I therefore addressed letters to the
clerks of the supreme courts of the various states of the Union
asking them for information concerning the state of business in
their courts. I met with courteous replies from all but three.
These replies revealed somewhat to my surprise that a great proportion of the courts of last resort were entirely abreast of their
calendars and up with their work, only fourteen states reporting
that their courts were behind. It appeared that Colorado was two
years behind with its work; California, one to two years; Oregpn,
one year; Missouri, two years; Nebraska, one year; Idaho, two
years; New York Court of Appeals, two years; Montana, two
years; Louisiana, two and one-half years; Texas, two years; Xentucky, nine months; and Indiana, two years.
In Oklahoma the civil division was one thousand cases behind
in its work and the criminal division five hundred cases behind;
but it was not stated how long it would take to dispose of those
cases; so that while it is certain that the supreme court of Okla-
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homa is considerably behind with its work, it cannot be stated
definitely how far behind it is, measured in terms of time.
From the state of Georgia it was reported that at the close of the
March term, which occurred on the first Monday in October, 1918,
three hundred cases which had been submitted were undecided.
It was interesting to note that the cases pending before the
courts ranged all the way from five in the state of Delaware to
1,500 in the state of Oklahoma. From many of the states reporting an accumulation of work it was stated that measures for
relief were in contemplation.
From this information it may be expected that in the near future
the state courts of the entire country will be placed upon a basis
enabling them to take care of the work in due course, and that
the conditions justifying criticism of courts' delays will be eliminated so far as courts of last resort are concerned. There is
reason to believe, however, that in many of the larger cities of
the country trial courts are most exasperatingly behind with their
work. In Chicago, for instance, a trial of a case within three
or four years after its commencement is not to be thought of.
Let us now refer to the decisions of the supreme court of this
state to see whether that court has unduly interfered with the carrying out of what we may call the progressive program of the state.
In so doing, I shall assume the power of the court to declare laws
unconstitutional. The power of the court in this respect is declared by some, judges among them, to have been usurped. However, the power of the courts in this regard is now too well established to be a judicial question. I apprehend that it would be
rather startling for a court at this time to renounce its power
and its duty in this -respect. If it is thought that this power does
not properly reside with the courts, it may be changed by constitutional amendment. But whether it should be or not is a
political question, and one with which we are not here concerned.
The last twenty years mark an epoch in the history not only
of this state but of the nation. The people have more actively
participated in the affairs of government and have insisted that
government should more fully respond to public interests. Many
laws have been enacted calculated to destroy special privilege and
to promote the public interest. In this state there are at least
ten such laws, laws of statewide interest, importance and influence,
laws somewhat new and novel, which I shall designate as laws of
major importance. These laws were (I) a law imposing upon
67
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railroad companies certain penalties for failure to pay their taxes;
an ad valorem tax law for railroads; .(3) an inheritance
(2)
tax law; (4) a law establishing a Railroad Rate Commission;
(5) a primary election law; (6) a civil service law; (7) a workmen's compensation act; (8) water power legislation; (9) income tax law; and (io) forestry legislation. The nature of these
-laws is well understood by the people of this state and further
specification of their provisions is unnecessary.
The constitutionality of all these laws was challenged in the
courts of this state. They were not only challenged, but they
were challenged vigorously. They were challenged by the powerful interests of the state. The challenge was backed up by the
ablest counsel of the state. The -result was that every law was
held constitutional, except the water power and the forestry law.
The decision of the supreme court vindicating the railroad tax
penalty law will be found in 128 Wis. 449; the ad valorem law, in
128 Wis. 553; the inheritance tax law, in 129 Wis. i9o; and again
in 139 Wis. 544; the railroad commission law was upheld as
constitutional in 136 Wis. 146; and again in 163 Wis. 145; in a
subsequent case, that of the Northwestern Railway Company vs.
The Railroad Cqmmission, reported in 156 Wis. 47, an attempt
was made by the railroad company to secure a construction of the
law which would seriously limit and embarrass the railroad commission in the performance of its functions. It was there contended that the commission's decisions must be based upon evidence produced and introduced at the hearing, and that it could
not take into consideration knowledge of an expert nature within
the possession of the commissioners, or so called judicial notice
of certain reports and records on file in its office. This contention
was repudiated by the court and the power and authority of the
commission greatly vitalized.
The primary election law was sustained in 142 Wis. 320; the
civil service law, in 146 Wis. 291; the workmen's compensation
act, in 127 Wis. 327; the income tax law, in 148 Wis. 456.
'The only laws of major importance condemned by the court, as
already stated, were the water power law, 148 Wis. 124, and the
forestry law, i6o Wis. 221. The water power law declared that
all water powers belonged to the state, denied any private ownership thereof, and prescribed regulations for their development
upon such hypothesis. The court held that the right to use the
water of a navigable river for the creation or development of
68
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power upon his own land is a riparian right appurtenant to the
land and belongs to the owner of such land, which the state could
not take away without due compensation.
This is the only instance in which major legislation was denied
constitutionality by the supreme court at the suit of private interests. The forestry case did not represent a contest between
public and private interests. The constitutionality of that law was
raised by the state itself, and both sides of the case were presented
to the court by attorneys paid by'the state, so that in the litigation
resulting in the condemnation of the law the public was represented
on both sides. The only instance, therefore, where major legislation in the interest of the public met with judicial condemnation
at the suit of private parties is the decision of the court in the
water power case. Whether that case was decided rightly or
wrongly must be a matter of individual opinion. It is not the
purpose of this article to defend the court in any of its decisions,
but rather to place before the public facts with reference to the
general attitude of the judiciary of this state towards legislation
enacted in the public interest.
In addition to this major legislation, a number of laws enacted
for the purpose of promoting equality and the public welfare,
which have been assailed as unconstitutional, but sustained, may
be mentioned. The program has included numerous laws for the
purpose of bringing about a more efficient enforcement of the
taxing power of the state in order to promote equalization of the
burdens of taxation. The laws creating the office of county supervisor of assessment, who, the law provided, should be appointed
by the county board, was assailed on the ground that it violated
sec. 4, art. 6 of the Constitution, for the reason that, being a
county officer, he should be elected by the people. This contention
was repudiated in State ex rel Williams vs. Samuelson, 131 Wis.
499.
Ch. 215 of the Laws of 1905 provided for the appointment
of persons by the State Tax Commissioners to assess the property
of a particular assessment district or to review the assessment
made therein when certain complaint was made to the tax commission. The tax commission declined to act under this law for a
number of years, regarding it as unconstitutional legislation, and
counseled its repeal by the legislature. The legislature refusing to
repeal the law, however, the state tax commission finally acted under it, and the constitutionality of the law was promptly brought
69
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in question. Its constitutionality was affirmed in State ex rel
Hessey vs. Damiels, 143 Wis. 649.
In this connection should also be mentioned the case of Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. vs. State, 163 Wis. 484, sustaining
the statute imposing taxes upon life insurance companies. The
Northwestern Life Insurance Company, deeming this law to be
unconstitutional, paid its taxes under protest, and brought action
to recover back from the state taxes paid by it amounting to
approximately one million dollars. The law was held constitutional by the court, which decision was affirmed upon an appeal to
the Supreme Court of the United States.
A law providing for the appointment of jury commissioners
by circuit judges was upheld as constitutional in 133 Wis. 461.
A law providing for the election of trustees by the county board
to have charge of county institutions, was upheld in State ex rel
Busacker vs. Groth, 132 Wis. 263.
The appointment of a committee by the legislature to investigate
and obtain information in regard to the working of the primary
election law, with a view of enacting further laws on the subject,
with authority to the committee to spend moneys in the course of
such investigation, was challenged in the courts, but the authority
was sustained in State ex rel Rosenhein vs. Frear, 138 Wis. 173.
This decision was of great importance in promoting intelligent
and well-considered legislation.
In State ex rel Williams vs. Sawyer County, 130 Wis. 634, it
was held that in matters purely local and municipal the legislature
may enact a constitutional law and refer to the people or proper
municipal authorities to decide whether such law shall or shall
not have force and effect in their respective municipalities, but
such law must be a complete enactment in itself.
In State ex iel Wickham vs. Nygaard, 159 Wis. 396, it was held
that the salary of a state officer was not exempt from income taxes.
In State vs. Lange Canning Company, 164 Wis. 228, it was held
that a law empowering the industrial commission to prescribe
hours of labor for females was not unconstitutional as being an
unlawful delegation of power.
In Kiley vs. C. M. &' St. P. R. Co., 138 Wis. 215, the constitutionality of Ch. 244, Laws of 19o7, which made every railroad
company liable for damages for all injuries whether resulting in
death or not, sustained by any of its employees (i) When such
injury was caused by a defect in any locomotive, engine, car, rail,
70
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track, roadbed, machinery or appliance used by its employees in
and about the business of their employment; (2) When such injury shall have been sustained by any officer, agent, servant or
employee of such company, while engaged in the line of his duty
as such and when such injury shall have been caused in whole or
in greater part by the negligence of any other officer, agent,
servant, or employee of such company in the discharge of, or by
reason of failure to discharge, his duty as such. It was provided
that the provisions of the act shall not apply to employees working
in shops and offices. This law was assailed by the railroad company on the ground that it singled out railroads from all other
employers and made them liable for injuries sustained by their
employees under circumstances which do not subject any other
employers of labor to like damages, by reason of which the law
was discriminatory and denied the railroads the equal protection
of the law.
A court having a penchant for annulling acts of the legislature
and for protecting special interests could very well have adopted
the contention of the railroad company in that case. The court,
however, held that the peculiar hazards incident to the operation
of railroads distinguished that from any other business and furnished a proper basis for classification. It was not so easy, however, to justify the sub-classification by which shop and office
employees were excluded from the provisions of the act. The
act included within its provisions all railroad employees except
shop and office employees. It included employees engaged in
cutting grass upon the railroad right of way, or building fences,
or building bridges, or doing work of construction and engineering,
or providing supplies such as ties and a great many other things
that might be mentioned having no connection whatever with
the operating feature of a railroad, which only is characterized
by special railroad risks. The court nevertheless justified the subclassification and held the law constitutional. Instead of presenting a situation where a court introduced refined distinctions for
the purpose of condemning a law, the profession generally will
agree that distinctions were refined here rather for the purpose
of upholding the law. It is worth while to make special mention
of this case in view of the fact that it was a law enacted in the
interests of railroad employees; that its constitutionality was not
only vigorously attacked, but the attack was supported by at least
very plausible argument, which the court might well have adopted
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in pursuance of a disposition to use the constitution as a shield
and protection for special and corporate interests.
The case of Milwaukee Electric Railway & Light Co. vs. Railroad Commission, 153 Wis. 592, also involved a question of the
greatest importance to the people of the state. The ordinance of
the city of Milwaukee granting a franchise to the Railway Company fixed the fare to be charged by the company at five cents.
The question was whether this ordinance constituted a contract
which was protected by constitutional provisions and deprived the
state of power to change the rate of fare, as ,contended by the
street car company. It was held that the ordinance did not divest
the legislature, through its created agency the Railroad Commission, of the power to prescribe reasonable rates of fare. Time
will not permit the elaboration necessary to fully point out the
importance and far reaching effect of that decision. Suffice it to
say that it was a great victory for the public.
The Wisconsin Workmen's Compensation Act was one of the
first to be enacted in this country. The constitutionality of this
act was not only upheld by our court after compensation acts had
been annulled in New York and one or two other states, but the
court did a great deal prior to the passage of the act to stimulate
sentiment resulting in its enactment. On numerous occasions,
in writing opinions in personal injury cases, the court went out of
its way to call attention to the injustice of established principles
of law, which too often laid upon employees engaged in hazardous
pursuits the entire burden of accidents inevitable in the industry.
Thus, in a concurring opinion in Driscoll vs. Allis-Chalmers Co.,
144 Wis. 468, Chief Justice Winslow said:
"I agree that under existing rules of law this judgment
must be reversed."
After a discussion of the principles of law applicable to the
situation, he continued:
"It gives me no pleasure to state these long established
principles of the law of negligence. I have no fondness for
them. If I were to consult my feelings alone I would far prefer to let the case pass in silence. No part of my labor on this
bench has brought such heartweariness to me as that everincreasing part devoted to the consideration of personal
injury actions brought by employees against their employers.
The appeal to the emotions is so strong in these cases, the
results to life and limb and human happiness so distressing,
that the attempt to honestly administer cold, hard rules of
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law which either deny relief entirely or necessitate a new
trial make drafts upon the heart and nerves which no man
can appreciate who has not been obliged to meet the situation
himself. If it be said that some of these rules are archaic
and unfitted to modem industrial conditions I do not disagree; in fact that has been my own opinion for long."
Similar language was used by Justice Marshall in a dissenting
opinion in 140 Wis. 457, as well as in an independent opinion
in 144 Wis. 353.
It is proper to state at this time that there were fifteen
lawyers in the state senate, but two less than a majority of that
body, when the Workmen's Compensation Act was passed. Every
lawyer voted for the passage of that bill. Every lawyer realized
that the enactment of such a law would result in a pecuniary loss
to the profession in general and to him in particular. One lawyer, a member of the senate who voted for the bill, assured me
that its passage meant the elimination of fifty per cent. of his
income. The incident but typifies the generous and unselfish disposition of the legal profession. No other class so willingly
subordinate individual or selfish interest to that of the public
welfare.
But to return to our subject The point I am making could be
illustrated by other cases, reference to which time forbids. In
many cases, not herein referred to, has the constitutionality of
laws been sustained. I have deemed it sufficient for the purposes
of this article to select those more important laws placed upon
our statute books as the result of political struggle -curtailing the
power and privilege of special interests, making the government
serve the people and, generally, promoting what the late Hon.
Theodore Roosevelt would call "a square deal." It must be admitted that in carrying out as comprehensive a program for such
purpose as has been conceived by any state of the Union, the
people of this state have been singularly free from judicial obstruction or interference.
But it should not be inferred that the court abandoned its
judicial functions or evidenced timidity or lack of courage in
grappling with constitutional questions. It has not hesitated to
condemn legislation deemed by it to be unconstitutional and has
at all times taken a courageous view of its duty when the constitutionality of statutes has been challenged. Though taken from
a dissenting opinion, the following language by Mr. Justice Marshall faithfully reflects the conception of the court, as it was con-
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stituted during the period we are considering, of the nature and
character of its duty whenever questions concerning the constitutionality of statutes were before it, and its reported decisions
indicate that it was at all times guided by the principles expressed
by the learned justice, as follows:
"The most important judicial authority lodged in this
court is that of passing upon the validity of legislative enactments. That great power is given to the court by the constitution, as definitely, if not as expressly, as power is given
to the legislature to enact laws. in its special field the court
is absolutely independent. It is answerable only to the
people as their will is seen in the fundamental law. The
power is not discretionary, now to be exercised and then
not to be, according as mere expediency may seem to dictate.
It is obligatory in character as to every situation legitimately
invoking its activity. It must be jealously guarded and
courageously vindicated upon all proper occasions, if our
constitutional system of liberty is to endure.
"Those who are wont to regard activity of the court's
power mentioned as an unwarrantable, or at least a regrettable interference with legislative authority, evince want of
comprehension of our system of government or want of
appreciation of the broad scope of those constitutional limitations designed to guard at all points every individual in
the enjoyment of every right essential to those fundamentals:
'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness' for which 'governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.'
"The importance of our constitutional restraints and the
high prerogative power of applying them, is as progressive as
is the need for regulation, to the end that such regulation
may not overleap its legitimate boundaries and enter the
domain of the destructive. It will be a sorry day for our
country when the time comes, if it ever does-let us hope
and believe that it never will-that the invincible weaponthe constitution-vitalized by an independent and fearless
judiciary, shall not efficiently bar excursions into the domain
of unbridled interference with individual rights.
"If that is more important to any one element in society
than to another, it is the weakest, hence the most helpless.
So it is of the highest importance to the public, and particularly to the most humble portion thereof, that courts
should grapple, willingly and effectively, with every question
presented for solution involving validity of legislation on
constitutional grounds.
"How wisely the fathers must have looked into the future
when-with the evident purpose of their language being
regarded as a command from the body of the people to all
in authority, so long as the constitution should endure-they
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penned the words: 'The blessings of a free government can
only be maintained by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality and virtue, and by frequent recurrence to fundamental principles.'
"The saying that the court of last resort should willingly
apply the test of constitutional limitations, is not to be taken
as suggesting judicial desire or haste to declare that not law
which has the form of law. In no case should the court enter
upon any doubtful ground. It should accord to the cobrdinate department the highest consideration, not condemning
its action so long as any reasonable basis can be discovered
for upholding it, but if none can be discovered, not hesitating
to put the stamp of judicial disapproval upon it."
But as evidence that the court appreciated the difficulties of
accommodating a fixed and unyielding constitution to the ever
changing conditions, problems and ideals of the people, as well as
its disposition to go to the uttermost lengths of reconciling legislative action with constitutional limitations, I quote the language
used by Chief Justice Winslow in the opinion of the court upholding the constitutionality of the Workmen's Compensation Act
(Borgnis vs. Falk, i47 Wis. pp. 348 and 349) which, in my judgment, time will embalm as a legal classic:
"In approaching the consideration of the present law we
must bear in mind the well established principle that it must
be sustained unless it be clear beyond reasonable question
that it violates some constitutional limitation or prohibition.
"That governments founded on written constitutions
which are made difficult of amendment or change lose much
in flexibility and adaptibility to changed conditions there
can be no doubt. Indeed, that may be said to be one purpose
of the written constitution. Doubtless they gain enough in
stability and freedom from mere whimsical and sudden
changes to more than make up for the loss in flexibility; but
the loss still remains, whether for good or ill. A constitution
is a very human document, and must embody with greater
or less fidelity the spirit of the time of its adoption. It will
be framed to meet the problems and difficulties which face
the men who make it, and it will generally crystallize with
more or less fidelity the political, social and economic propositions which are considered irrefutable, if not actually inspired, by the philosophers and legislators of the time. But
the difficulty is that, while the constitution is fixed or very
hard to change, the conditions and problems surrounding
the people, as well as their ideals, are constantly changing.
The political or philosophical aphorism of one generation
is doubted by the next, and entirely discarded by the third;
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the race moves forward constantly, and no Canute can stay
its progress.
"Constitutional commands and prohibitions, either distinctly laid down in express words or necessarily implied
from general words, must be obeyed, and implicitly obeyed,
so long as they remain unamended or unrepealed. Any other
course on the part of either legislator or judge constitutes
violation of his oath of office. But when there is no such
express command or prohibition but only general language,
or a general policy drawn from the four corners of the instrument, what shall be said about this? By what standards
is this general language or general policy to be interpreted
and applied to present-day people and conditions?
"When an eighteenth century constitution forms the
charter of liberty of a twentieth century government must its
general provisions be construed and interpreted by an eighteenth century mind in the light of eighteenth century conditions and ideals? Clearly not. This were to command the
race to halt in its progress, to stretch the state upon a veritable bed of Procrustes.
"Where there is no express command or prohibition, but
only general language or policy to be considered, the conditions prevailing at the time of its adoption must have their
due weight; but the changed social, economic, and governmental conditions and ideals of the time, as well as the problems which the changes have produced, must also logically
enter into the consideration, and become influential factors
in the settlement of problems of construction and interpretation."
These two quotations fully reveal the attitude and disposition
of the court as then constituted, and fr6m them we may judge
that the court at all times fearlessly discharged its serious responsibility in the matter of vindicating and preserving those safeguards provided in, and the sacred rights protected by, the
constitution, at the same time sincerely striving to adapt a constitution made by former generations to the conditions and problems
of the present time.
Will not the judgment of the people construe their views as
broad and generous, their discharge of duty fearless and wise?
Address read before Wisconsin and Minnesota State Bar Association
Conventions, ig2o.

